Visheshika Darshana

Vaisheshika, or Vaiśeṣika, (Sanskrit: वैशॆषिक) is one of the six Hindu schools of philosophy (orthodox Vedic systems) in India. Historically, it has been closely associated with the Hindu school of logic, Nyaya.

Vaisesika holds a form of atomism and assumes that all objects in the physical universe are reducible to a finite number of atoms. It was originally proposed by the sage Kaṇāda (or Kana-bhuk, literally atom eater) around the 2nd century BC.

Overview

Although the Vaishesika system developed independently of the Nyaya, the two eventually merged due to their closely related metaphysical theories. In its classical form, however, the Vaishesika school differed from the Nyaya in one fundamental respect: where the Nyaya accepted the four sources of valid knowledge, the Vaishesika accepted only perception and inference. Although not among the original Kannada philosophies,[2] later Vaishesika atomism also differs from the atomic theory of modern science in that it asserts that the functioning of atoms (or the characterization of them that makes them function in a way) was directed or controlled by the will of a Supreme Being. It is therefore a theistic form of atomism.

An alternative view would qualify the above in that the holism evident in the ancient texts requires the identification of six separate traditional milieus of philosophy, consisting of three sets of two pairs.

Literature of Vaisheshika

The earliest systematic exposition of vaisheshika is found in the Vaiśeṣika sūtra of Kaṇāda (or Kaṇabhaksha). This treatise is divided into ten books. Two commentaries on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, Rāvaṇabhāṣya and Bhāradvājavṛtti, are no longer extant. Another important work of this school is Praśastapāda’s Padārthadharmasaṁgraha (c. 4th century). Although this treatise is commonly known as the bhāṣya of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, it is essentially an independent work on the subject. Another Vaisheshika treatise, Candra’s Daśapadārthaśāstra (648) based on Praśastapāda’s treatise, is only available in Chinese translation. The earliest available commentary on Praśastapāda’s treatise is Vyomaśiva’s Vyomavatī (8th century). The other three commentaries are Śridhara’s Nyāyakandalī (991), Udayana’s Kiranāvali (10th century) and Śrivats’ Līlāvatī (11th century). Śivāditya’s Saptapadārthī, which also belongs to the same period, presents the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika principles as part of a single whole. Śaṁkara Miśra’s Upaskāra on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra is also an important work.

The categories or padartha

According to the Vaisheshika school, all things that exist, that can be known and that can be named, are padārthas (literal meaning: meaning of a word), objects of experience. All objects of experience can be divided into six categories, dravya (substance), guṇa (quality), karma (activity), sāmānya (generality), viśeṣa (specificity) and samavāya (inherence). Later the Vaiśeṣikas (Śrīdhara and Udayana and Śivāditya) added one more category of abhāva (non-existence). The first three categories are defined as artha (which can be perceived) and have real objective existence. The last three categories are defined as budhyapekṣam (product of intellectual discrimination) and are logical categories.

Categories

1. Dravya (substance): Substances are conceived as 9 in number. They are pṛthvī (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire), vāyu (air), ākaśa (sky), kāla (time), dik (space), ātman (self) and manas (mind). The first five are called bhūtas, substances have certain specific properties so that they can be perceived by one or the other external senses.
2. Guṇa (quality): The Vaiśeṣika Sūtra mentions 17 gunas (qualities), to which Praśastapāda added 7 more. While substance is capable of independent existence, a guṇa (quality) cannot exist. The original 17 guṇas (qualities) are rūpa (colour), rasa (taste), gandha (fragrance), sparśa (touch), saṁkhyā (number), parimāṇa (size/dimension/quantity), pṛthaktva (individuality), saṁyoga (connection/ accompaniments), vibhāga (disjunction), paratva (priority), aparatva (posteriority), buddhi (knowledge), sukha (pleasure), duḥkha (pain), icchā (desire), dveṣa (aversion) and prayatna (striving). To these Praśastapāda added gurutva (heaviness), dravatva (fluidity), sneha (viscosity), dharma (merit), adharma (defects), śabda (sound) and saṁkāsra (ability).
3. Karma (activity): The karmas (activities) like guṇas (qualities) have no separate existence, they belong to the substances. But while a quality is a permanent feature of a substance, an activity is a transient one. Ākaśa (sky), kāla (time), dik (space) and ātman (self), though substances, are devoid of karma (activity).
4. Sāmānya (generality): Since there are plurality of substances, there will be relations among them. When a property is found common to many substances, it is called sāmānya.
5. Viśeṣa (particularity): By means of viśeṣa , we are able to perceive substances as different from one another. As the ultimate atoms are innumerable so are the viśeṣas.
6. Samavāya (inherence): Kaṇāda defined samavāya as the relation between the cause and the effect. Praśastapāda defined it as the relationship existing between the substances that are inseparable, standing to one another in the relation of the container and the contained. The relation of samavāya is not perceivable but only inferable from the inseparable connection of the substances.

Epistemology and syllogism

Early Vaiśeṣika epistemology considered only pratyaksha (perception) and anumāna (inference) as pramaṇas (means of valid knowledge). The other two modes of valid knowledge accepted by the Nyaya school, upamāna (comparison) and śabda (verbal testimony), were considered included in anumāna. The syllogism of the Vaiśeṣika school was similar to the Nyaya syllogism, but the names given by Praśastapāda to the 5 members of the syllogism are different.

The atomic theory

Early Vaiśeṣika texts presented the following syllogism to prove that all objects, i.e. the four bhūtas, pṛthvī (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire) and vāyu (air) are made of indivisible paramāṇas (atoms). Suppose matter is not made up of indivisible atoms and is continuous. Take the stone. It can be broken into infinitely many pieces (because matter is continuous). Now the Himalayas also have an infinite number of pieces. So now, another Himalayan can be built with the infinite number of pieces it has. One starts with a stone and ends with the Himalayas, which is of course ridiculous. So, the original assumption that matter is continuous must be wrong, and so all objects must be made up of a finite number of paramāṇas (atoms).

According to the Vaiśeṣika school, the trasareṇu (dust particles visible in a sunbeam passing through a small opening in a window) are the smallest mahat (perceptible) particles. They are defined as tryaṇukas (triads). They consist of three parts, each of which is defined as a dvyaṇuka (dyad). Dvyaṇukas are conceived as composed of two parts, each of which is defined as a paramāṇu (atom). Paramāṇu (atoms) are indivisible and eternal, neither created nor destroyed. Each paramāṇu (atom) has its own distinct viśeśa (individuality).

Later developments

Over the centuries, the school merged with the Nyaya school of Indian philosophy to form the combined Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school. The school suffered a natural decline in India after the 15th century.