Nyaya Darshana

Nyāya (Sanskrit ni-āyá, literally “recursion”, used in the sense of “syllogism, conclusion”) is the name given to one of the six orthodox or astika schools of Hindu philosophy—specifically, the school of logic. The Nyaya school of philosophical speculation is based on texts known as the Nyaya Sutras written by Aksapada Gautama from around the 2nd century AD.

Overview

The most important contribution of the Nyaya school to modern Hindu thought is its methodology. This methodology is based on a system of logic that was subsequently adopted by most other Indian schools, whether orthodox or not. This is comparable to saying that Western science and philosophy are largely based on Aristotelian logic.

However, Nyaya differs from Aristotelian logic in that it is more than logic in itself. His followers believed that the acquisition of valid knowledge was the only way to attain liberation from suffering. They therefore went to great lengths to identify valid sources of knowledge and distinguish them from mere false opinions. Nyaya is thus a form of epistemology alongside logic.

According to the Nyaya school, there are exactly four sources of knowledge (pramanas): perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Of course, the insights gained through each may still be valid or invalid. Consequently, Nyaya scholars again took great pains to identify in each case what was required for knowledge to be valid, in the process of creating a series of explanatory schemes. In this sense, Nyaya is probably the closest Indian equivalent of contemporary analytic philosophy.

Nyaya metaphysics recognizes sixteen padarthas or categories and subsumes all six (or seven) vaisheshika categories into the second of these, called prameya. The sixteen categories are pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge), prameya (objects of valid knowledge), saṁśaya (doubt), prayojana (goal), dṛṣṭānta (example), siddhānta (conclusion), avayava (members of syllogism), tarka reasoning), nirṇaya ( settlement), vāda (discussion), jalpa (arguments), vitaṇḍā (staggering), hetvābhāsa (delusion), chala (argument), jāti (sophisticated refutation) and nigrahasthāna (point of defeat).

Epistemology

Nyaya epistemology considers knowledge (jñāna) or cognition (buddhi) to be apprehension (upalabdhi) or consciousness (anubhava). Knowledge can be valid or invalid. The Naiyayikas (Nyaya scholars) adopted four valid means (pramaṇa) to acquire valid knowledge (prama) – perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna) and verbal testimony (śabda). Invalid knowledge includes memory (smṛti), doubt (saṁśaya), error (viparyaya) and hypothetical reasoning (tarka).

Perception

Pratyakṣa (perception) occupies a prominent position in Nyaya epistemology. Perception is defined by Akṣapāda Gautama in his Nyaya Sutra (I,i.4) as “the unerring knowledge which arises from the contact of the sense organs with objects, which is not associated with a name and is well defined”. . Perception can be of two types, laukika (ordinary) and alaukika (extraordinary).

Ordinary perception

Ordinary (laukika or sadharana) perception is of six types – visual with the eyes, olfactory with the nose, auditory with the ears, tactile with the skin, gustatory with the tongue and the mental mind.

Extra-ordinary perception

Extraordinary (Alaukika or Asadharana) perception is of three types, viz. Samanyalakshana (perception of generality from a certain object), Jñanalakshana (when one sense organ can perceive even qualities that cannot be attributed to it, like when we see a chili, one knows that it would be bitter or hot) and Yoga (when certain human beings from the power yogis can perceive the past, present and future and have supernatural powers, either complete or some).

Naiyayika maintains two modes or stages of perception. The first is called nirvikalpa (indefinite), when a person only perceives an object without being able to know its features, and the second savikalpa (definite), when he is able to clearly recognize the object. All laukika and alaukika pratyakshas are savikalpa, but necessarily preceded by an earlier stage when it is indeterminate. Vātsāyana says that if an object is perceived with its name, we have a definite perception, but if it is perceived without a name, we have an indeterminate perception. Jayanta Bhatta says that indeterminate perception conceives substance, qualities and actions and universals as something separate and indistinct and also has no connection with the name, while definite perception conceives all these together with the name. There is another stage called Pratyabhijñā where one is able to recognize something again based on memory.

Inference

Anumāna (inference) is one of the most important contributions of Nyaya. It can be of two types: inference for oneself (Svarthanumana, where one needs no formal procedure and at most the last three of their 5 steps) and inference for others (Parathanumana, which requires a systematic 5 step methodology). ). Deduction can also be divided into 3 types: Purvavat (inferring an unperceived effect from a perceived cause), Sheshavat (inferring an unperceived cause from a perceived effect) and Samanyatodrishta (where the inference is not based on causality but on uniformity of coexistence). . A detailed error analysis is also provided to explain when anumana could be false.

Comparison

Upamāna, which can be roughly translated as simile, is the knowledge of the relationship between a word and the object denoted by the word. It arises from the knowledge of similarity or likeness, if some preliminary description of the new object is given in advance.

Verbal testimony

Sabda or verbal testimony is defined as the declaration of a trustworthy person (āptavākya) and consists in understanding its meaning. It can be of two types, Vaidika (Vedic) which are the words of the four sacred Vedas and are described as the Word of God composed by God and Laukika or the words and writings of trustworthy human beings. while the Vaidika testimony is perfect because the Vedas are spoken by God, the Laukika testimony is not infallible.

Theory of inference

The methodology of inference involves a combination of induction and deduction by moving from particular to particular via generality. It has five steps, as in the example shown:

• There is fire on the hill (called Pratijñā, required to be proved)
• Because there is smoke there (called Hetu, reason)
• Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, e.g. in a kitchen (called Udāhārana, example of vyāpti)
• The hill has smoke that is pervaded by fire (called Upanaya, reaffirmation or application)
• Therefore there is fire on the hill (called Nigamana, conclusion)

In Nyāya terminology for this example, the hill would be called as paksha (minor term), the fire is called as sādhya (major term), the smoke is called as hetu, and the relationship between the smoke and the fire is called as vyāpti(middle term). Hetu further has five characteristics: It must be (1)present in the Paksha, (2) present in all positive instances, (3) absent in all negative instances, (4) It must not incompatible with the minor term or Paksha and (5) All other contradictions by other means of knowledge should be absent.

The fallacies in Anumana (hetvābhasa) may occur due to the following:

1. Asiddha: It is the unproved hetu that results in this fallacy. [Paksadharmata] : Ashrayasiddha: If Paksha [minor term] itself is unreal, then there cannot be locus of the hetu. e.g. The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus like any other lotus.
   : Svarupasiddha: Hetu cannot exist in paksa at all. E.g. Sound is a quality, because it is visible.
   : Vyapyatvasiddha: Conditional hetu. `Wherever there is fire, there is smoke’. The presence of smoke is due to wet fuel.
2. Savyabhichara: This is the fallacy of irregular hetu.
   : Sadharana: The hetu is too wide. It is present in both sapaksa and vipaksa. `The hill has fire because it is knowable’.
     : Asadharana: The hetu is too narrow. It is only present in the Paksha, it is not present in the Sapaksa and in the Vipaksha. `Sound is eternal because it is audible’.
         : Anupasamhari: Here the hetu is non-exclusive. The hetu is all-inclusive and leaves nothing by way of sapaksha or vipaksha. e.g. ‘All things are non-ternal, because they are knowable’.
3. Satpratipaksa: Here the hetu is contradicted by another hetu. If both have equal force, then nothing follows. ‘Sound is eternal, because it is audible’, and ‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced’. Here ‘audible’ is counter-balanced by ‘produced’ and both are of equal force.
4. Badhita: When another proof (as by perception) definitely contradicts and disproves the middle term (hetu). ‘Fire is cold because it is a substance’.
5. Viruddha: Instead of proving something it is proving the opposite. ‘Sound is eternal because it is produced’.

The Nyaya theory of causation

A cause is defined as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an effect and an effect as an unconditional and invariable consequent of a cause. The same cause produces the same effect; and the same effect is produced by the same cause. The cause is not present in any hidden form whatsoever in its effect.

The following conditions should be met:

1. The cause must be antencedent [Purvavrtti]
2. Invariability [Niyatapurvavrtti]
3. Unconditionality [Ananyathasiddha]

Nyaya recognizes five kinds of accidental antecedents [Anyathasiddha]

1. Mere accidental antecedent. E.g., The colour of the potter’s cloth.
2. Remote cause is not a cause because it is not unconditional. E.g., The father of the potter.
3. The co-effects of a cause are not causally related.
4. Eternal substances, or eternal conditions are not unconditional antecedents. e.g. space.
5. Unnecessary things, e.g. the donkey of the potter.

Nyaya recognizes three kinds of cause:

1. Samavayi, material cause. E.g. Thread of a cloth.
2. Asamavayi, colour of the thread which gives the colour of the cloth.
3. Nimitta’, efficient cause, e.g. the weaver of the cloth

Anyathakyativada of Nyaya

The theory of the Naya error is similar to that of Kumarila’s Viparita-khyati (see Mimamsa). The Naiyayikas also believe like Kumarila that error is due to a wrong synthesis of presented and represented objects. The represented object is confused with the presented one. The word “anyatha” means “otherwise” and “elsewhere” and both these meanings are rendered by mistake. The presented object is perceived differently and the represented object exists elsewhere. He further asserts that knowledge is not actually valid but becomes so based on external conditions (paratah pramana during validity and invalidity).

Nyaya argument for the existence of God

The early Naiyayikas wrote very little about God, i.e. Ishvara (literally, the Supreme Lord). Later, however, Buddhists in India turned from agnostics to strictly atheists. In response, the later Naiyayikas entered into disputes with the Buddhists, trying to prove the existence of God through logic. They have made this question a challenge to their very existence. They provided the following nine proofs for the existence of God, listed in Udayana’s Nyaya Kusumanjali.

Proof of existence of God

• Kāryāt (lit. “from effect”): An effect is produced by a cause, and similarly, the universe must also have a cause. Causes (according to Naiyayikas) are of three kinds: Samavayi (in case of the universe, the atoms), Asamavayi (the association of atoms) and Nimitta (which is Ishvara). The active cause of the world must have an absolute knowledge of all the material of creation, and hence it must be God. Hence from the creation, the existence of the Creator is proved.
• Āyojanāt (lit., from combination): Atoms are inactive and properties are unphysical. So it must be God who creates the world with his will by causing the atoms to join. Self-combination of inanimate and lifeless things is not possible, otherwise atoms would only combine at random, creating chaos. There is to be seen the hand of a wise organizer behind the systematic grouping of the ultimate atoms into dyads and molecules. That final organizer is God.
• Dhŗité(lit., from support): Just as a material thing falls off without a support, similarly, God is the supporter and bearer of this world, without which the world would not have remained integrated. This universe is hence superintended within God, which proves his existence.
• Padāt (lit., from word): Every word has the capability to represent a certain object. It is the will of God that a thing should be represented by a certain word. Similarly, no knowledge can come to us of the different things here unless there is a source of this knowledge. The origin of all knowledge should be omniscient and, consequently, omnipotent. Such a being is not to be seen in this universe, and so it must be outside it. This being is God.
• Pratyatah (lit, from faith): the Hindu holy scriptures, the Vedas, are regarded as the source of eternal knowledge. Their knowledge is free from fallacies and are widely believed as a source of proof. Their authors cannot be human beings because human knowledge is limited. They cannot obtain knowledge of past, present, and future, and in depth knowledge of mind. Hence, only God can be the creator of the Vedas. Hence, his existence is proved from his being the author of the Vedas, which he revealed to various sages over a period of time.
• Shrutéh (lit., from scriptures): The Shrutis, e.g., the Vedas extol God and talk about his existence. “He is the lord of all subjects, omniscient, and knower of one’s internal feelings; He is the creator, cause and destroyer of the world”, say the Shrutis. The Shrutis are regarded as a source of proofs by Naiyanikas. Hence, the existence of God is proved.
• Vākyāt (lit., from precepts): Again, the Veda must have been produced by a person because it has the nature of “sentences,” i.e., the sentences of the Veda were produced by a person because they have the nature of sentences, just as the sentences of beings like ourselves. That person must have been God.
• Samkhyāvişheshāt (lit., from the specialty of numbers): The size of a dyad or a molecule depends on the number of the atoms that constitute it. This requisite number of the atoms that form a particular compound could not have been originally the object of the perception of any human being; so its contemplator must be God.
• Adŗişhţāt (lit., from the unforeseen): It is seen that some people in this world are happy, some are in misery. Some are rich, and some are poor. The Naiyanikas explain this by the concept of Karma and reincarnation. The fruit of an individual’s actions does not always lie within the reach of the individual who is the agent. There ought to be, therefore, a dispenser of the fruits of actions, and this supreme dispenser is God.

Nyaya arguments for monotheism

Not only did the Naiyanikas provide evidence for the existence of God, but they also argued that there could be only one such God. In Nyaya Kusumanjali this is discussed against the proposal of the Mimamsa school – suppose that in the beginning there were many demigods (Devas) and sages (Rishis) who wrote the Vedas and created the world. Nyaya says that:

Omniscient beings, endowed with various superhuman powers of assuming infinitesimal size, and so forth, and capable of creating everything, then we answer that the law of parsimony commands us to suppose only one such, namely, His adorable Lord. There can be no trust in a non-eternal and non-omniscient being, and from this it follows that according to the system which rejects God, the tradition of the Veda is simultaneously overthrown; there is no other way open.

In other words, the Nyaya says that a polytheist would have to provide elaborate proofs of the existence and origin of his several celestial spirits, none of which would be logical. So it is much more logical to assume only one, eternal and omniscient God.

Literature of Nyaya

The oldest text of the Nyaya school is the Nyāya Sūtra of Akṣapāda Gautama. The text is divided into five books, each with two parts. Vātsāyana Nyāya Bhāṣya is a classical commentary on the Nyāya Sūtra. Udyotakar’s Nyāya Vārttika (6th century CE) is written in defense of Vātsāyana against the attacks of Dignāga. Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (9th century CE) by Vācaspati Miśra is another major exposition of this school. Two other texts, the Nyāyaṣūcinibandha and the Nyāyasūtraddhāra, are also attributed to him. Udayana’s (984 CE) Nyāyatātparyapariśuddhi is an important commentary on Vācaspati’s treatise. His Nyāyakusumāñjali is the first systematic account of theistic Nyāya. His other works include Ātmatattvaviveka, Kiraṇāvali and Nyāyapariśiṣṭa. Jayanta Bhatta’s Nyāyamañjari (10th century CE) is essentially an independent work. Bhāsavarajña Nyāyasāra (10th century CE) is a survey of Nyāya philosophy).

Later works on Nyāya adopted the Vaiśeṣika categories, and Varadarāja’s Tārkikarakṣā (12th century CE) is a notable treatise on this syncretistic school. Tārkabhaṣā by Keśava Miśra (13th century CE) is another important work of this school.

Gangeśa Upādhyāya’s Tattvacintāmaṇi (12th century CE) is the first major treatise of the new Navya Nyāya school. His son, Vardhamāna Upādhyāyi’s Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa (1225 AD), although a commentary on Udayana’s Nyāyatātparyapariśuddhi, incorporated his father’s views. Jayadeva wrote a commentary on the Tattvacintāmaṇi known as Āloka (13th century CE). Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma’s Tattvacintāmaṇivyākhyā (16th century CE) is the first major work of the Navadvipa Navya Nyāya school. Other important works of this school are Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Padārthakhaṇḍana. Viśvanath’s Nyāyasūtravṛtti (17th century CE) is also a notable work[7]. Commentaries on the Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti by Jagadish Tarkalankar (17th century CE) and Gadadhar Bhattacharya (17th century CE) are the last two notable works of this school.

Ānnaṁbhatta (17th century CE) attempted to develop a consistent system by combining the old and new schools, Prācina nyāya and Navya nyāya and Vaiśeṣika to develop the nyāya-vaiśeṣika school. His Tarkasaṁgraha and Dīpikā are popular manuals of this school.